# 2AC

## Monopsony ADV

### Monopsony---Impact---2AC

### AT: Poem

#### 6---Labor organizing is a site of empowerment for Black women that the alt works against. Link turns pathologization and invisibility impacts. That’s Perrin

<<<FOR REFFRENCE>>>

In the aftermath of the Civil War, as the United States grappled with Reconstruction, Black women — both formerly enslaved and free — emerged as a force in the labor movement. From laundresses in the 19th century to today’s domestic workers, their collective actions have been pivotal in demanding labor rights and dignity for Black women and all workers.

In the sweltering summer of 1881, 20 Black laundresses in Atlanta formed the Washing Society, a trade organization dedicated to securing better wages, respect, and autonomy over their work. They established a uniform rate of $1 per dozen pounds of laundry and, with the support of Black clergy, called for a citywide strike on July 19. Their numbers swelled rapidly, growing to 3,000 members within three weeks. These women employed door-to-door canvassing to rally support, even reaching out to white laundresses—an extraordinary act of interracial solidarity for the era.

Despite facing arrests, fines, and intimidation from city officials, the strikers remained resolute. Their unwavering determination not only led to increased wages but also inspired other domestic workers, including cooks and maids, to demand better working conditions.

The strike underscored the indispensable role of Black women in the New South’s economy and challenged societal norms that sought to render them invisible.

The spirit of resistance demonstrated by the Atlanta washerwomen set a precedent for future labor movements. In 1866, just a year after the Civil War, Black laundry workers in Jackson, Mississippi, went on strike to secure fair wages, recognizing the dependence of white households on their services.

Fast forward to the 20th century, and figures like Dorothy Bolden emerged as pivotal leaders. In 1968, Bolden founded the National Domestic Workers Union of America, organizing over 10,000 members to advocate for better wages and working conditions. She emphasized the importance of communication and negotiation, teaching domestic workers how to assert their rights and demand respect for their labor

Many Black women throughout history were unsung heroines of worker’s rights.

Rosina Corrothers Tucker, born the same year of the Atlanta labor action of 1881, helped form the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the first Black labor union recognized by the AFL-CIO. She also organized laundry and domestic workers. She lived to 105 and was an active labor force until her passing. At 100, she narrated a documentary of the Sleeping Car Porters, “Miles of Smiles. Years of Struggle.”

Nannie Helen Burroughs, another freedom stalwart who contributed to labor, education, and migrant rights, founded the National Association of Wage Earners in 1921, fighting for the rights of Black domestic workers and working-class women through education and policy advocacy. She also established the National Training School for Women and Girls and was a mentor to legions of activists in the emerging civil rights movement.

These women were part of a broader movement that extended beyond domestic labor. Clara Day, a leader in the Teamsters Union, fought for the rights of warehouse workers and addressed issues of workplace discrimination. Maida Springer Kemp, a labor organizer in the garment industry, went on to advocate for workers’ rights internationally, becoming a crucial link between U.S. labor movements and African workers’ struggles.

Today, the legacy of these early labor movements is evident in organizations like the National Domestic Workers Alliance (NDWA). In 2015, the NDWA launched We Dream in Black, an initiative aimed at building the collective power and visibility of Black caregivers, nannies, and professional cleaners. This collective invests in Black worker organizing infrastructure, particularly in the South, where anti-labor policies have historically posed challenges.

The impact of such initiatives is profound. Black women are increasingly taking leadership roles in labor unions, transforming priorities to focus on issues like family-friendly benefits, healthcare, and protections against sexual harassment. Their presence has led to significant strides in workplace equity, reshaping union policies and representation

The journey from the Atlanta washerwomen’s strike to today’s labor movements is a testament to resilience, solidarity, and an unwavering demand for justice. These pioneers have not only fought for their rights but have also laid the groundwork for future generations to continue the struggle for equitable labor practices. Their stories serve as powerful reminders of the enduring strength and agency of Black women in labor and life — refusing to be erased and demanding that their contributions be recognized and respected.

#### 7---Be pragmatic: solving problems is good even if our fixes are imperfect.

Richard Bärnthaler 24, Assistant professor of ecological economics at the University of Leeds, member of the European Society for Ecological Economics. "Problematising degrowth strategising: On the role of compromise, material interests, and coercion", Ecological Economics, September 2024, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108255>, Rslish

Debates on degrowth strategising often suggest that problem solving should be avoided in favour of radical action to “stay focused on all social structures [e.g., capitalism, colonialism, patriarchy, racism, ableism, nationalism] that combine to produce or ‘over-determine’ socio-ecological injustices” (Eckersley, 2021, 255, own insertion). Yet, as it is politically impossible to restructure everything at once, critical problem-solving in the service of transformation becomes crucial to prioritise certain goals over others (even if they are incommensurable) in a specific political context:

If uncritical problem-solving is like puzzle-solving, which accepts the fixed parameters set by the puzzle, then critical problem-solving looks for ways to unsettle at least some of these parameters as a first step, with a view to challenging others in subsequent steps. This requires provisionally bracketing some problematic social structures, recognising that not all can be tackled fully and at once (…). Critical problem-solving necessarily takes place in political contexts that are structurally unjust and communicatively distorted, so the practical task is to identify the next best transition steps with the greatest transformative potential in the relevant context, guided by conjunctural analysis. ‘Next best’ means the best of the politically possible next steps. Depending on the political opportunities presented by the conjuncture, in some cases the next best steps may be small and incremental, while in other cases there may be opportunities for larger leaps. … The judgment about whether the next steps will indeed prove to be the best cannot be fully known ex ante. The virtues of a step-wise approach is that it enables scaling up (or back) and adaptation ex post as a result of political and policy learning (Eckersley, 2021, 256).

#### 10---The Alt with a political counterpart can be a more effective means of guaranteeing demands

Sachin Waikar ’19, Writer for Stanford Business Insights, “It Takes More Than Mass Protests to Drive Change”, 7/18/19, <https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/it-takes-more-mass-protests-drive-change>, DA: 9/25/25, DMurph

Beyond understanding which groups made it to congressional hearings in general, Soule and Ganz examined the specific types of hearings on which a given type of organization had influence. “In the beginning of the legislative process,” Soule says, “when legislators are trying to figure out what constituents care about, they may pay attention to mass protests, for example, to understand public opinion, as a sort of informational signal.” Protests typically influence which issues the lawmakers will choose to address and eventually how they will vote on proposed legislation.

But there are multiple points between those two phases, most notably the crafting of legislative language. At that stage, they may call on social movement organizations for expert information, such as which nature preserves or species require the most urgent protection.

Soule’s research uncovered the importance of social movement organizations in both the investigatory (deciding what issues the public cares about) and policy-crafting (deciding how to address those issues) phases of the legislative process.

The study found that social movement organizations exert more influence during the later stages of policymaking than do other types of interest groups. Legislators appear to see social movement groups, due to their scientific expertise and perceived legitimacy, as offering higher-quality inputs than other organizations do.

Seek a Seat at the Table

Soule’s research has multiple implications for stakeholders in the legislative process.

“Our finding that social movement organizations offer valuable policy-related expertise probably isn’t shocking for legislators,” Soule says, “because they’re the ones deciding who gets to testify on an issue in the first place.” But she notes that lawmakers might be surprised by the strength of these groups’ influence on policymaking when compared with those representing other interests.

More important are the implications for social movement organizations themselves, as they think about how best to effect change. “With the rise of the internet,” Soule says, “modern movements can mobilize constituents through their websites and social media. If your end goal is to get 500,000 people to turn up on the Mall in Washington, D.C., Twitter is great at that. Facebook is great at that. But if your goal is to actually make lasting change in the system, you have to work within the system — to essentially get a seat at the table.”

“Occupy Wall Street,” she continues, “mobilized a lot of people and got a key point across about income inequality in the U.S. But did it result in real change? Unfortunately, no. Had there been a nice set of organizations able to get access to the political and economic system that the movement criticized, the changes may have been more enduring.”

#### 12---This is historically proven and making overarching claims that black women shouldn’t be a part of unions is overly essentialist.

Divya Amladi 24, Content Producer at OxFam; Camryn Cobb is a Content Producer at OxFam, “Unsung Black Women Heroes of the Labor Movement,” OxFam, 2/16/24, https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/unsung-black-women-heroes-of-the-labor-movement/

Sylvia Woods

1909-1987

Sylvia Woods, a Chicago-based union organizer and community activist, helped organize the Laundry Workers Union. She helped establish the Bendix Local 330 of the United Auto Workers (UAW) and even though only 25 percent of the membership was Black, she was elected financial secretary-treasurer of the UAW in.

Through her organizing efforts, Woods realized that racism is a tool used to divide the working class. She believed that Black and white workers had to unite to defend their collective rights, and that ideology guided much of her organizing work.

Hattie Canty

1933–2012

Hattie Canty was one of the greatest strike leaders in U.S. history. She worked several jobs in Las Vegas, from housekeeper to school janitor, and room attendant. She was active in the Culinary Workers Union (CWU) and eventually served as union president, becoming the first Black woman and room attendant in this position. As union president, Canty pushed for racial justice within the hospitality industry and union. She fought for workers to receive living wages and organized a successful 75-day walkout against Las Vegas casinos that won better health insurance benefits for culinary workers. In 1991, she led workers at the Frontier Hotel through a strike that ended up lasting six and a half year to negotiate better labor standards at the casinos.

Maida Springer Kemp

1910 – 2005

Maida Springer Kemp worked as a labor organizer in the garment industry and became the first Black woman to represent the U.S. labor movement overseas in 1945 when she visited Great Britain on a labor exchange trip. Kemp went on to spend many years liaising between American and African labor leaders as a member of the AFL-CIO and was affectionately known as “Mama Maida” for her work. Throughout her life she advocated for civil rights and women’s rights in America and internationally.

Rukia Lumumba

Rukia Lumumba is a transformative justice strategist and human rights advocate. While clerking for the Juvenile Rights Division of the Washington, DC, Public Defender Service, she helped collect data on human rights violations at the Oak Hill Youth Detention Center that contributed to the closing of the facility. She co-founded Katrina on the Ground, an initiative that organized over 700 college students to participate in post-Katrina relief efforts in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama.

Lumumba is the executive director of the People’s Advocacy Institute and co-coordinator of the Electoral Justice Project. She currently co-chairs the People’s Assembly process in Jackson, Miss, which works to increase community access to city government and institutionalize People’s Assemblies as community governing models that enable deep democratic participation of people in their own governance.

Danyelle Holmes

Danyelle Holmes works across political lines to fight for people living in poverty and low-income wage earners in the United States. She has been on the front lines of many political battles in the state of Mississippi, including leading the water distribution team to ensure that Jackson residents had access to clean drinking water following heavy flooding that affected poorly maintained city water systems and subsequent movements to stop the privatization of Jackson’s water and sewer infrastructure, to fully fund public education, and to remove the Confederate state flag.

Maria Harmon

Maria Harmon is the co-founder and co-director of Step Up Louisiana, a grassroots membership-based organization that advocates for economic and education justice across the state. Harmon started organizing at the age of 16. While studying at Southern University A&M College, she worked with the Louisiana Democratic Party to build a network of over 2,000 civically engaged students. She helped start Democracy Prep Public School of Baton Rouge by enrolling 192 students for their first school year in 2015-2016. Holmes has also worked for the Micah Project, a federation of the PICO National Network/Faith in Action, in 2016 as a community organizer working in education and civic engagement.

#### 13---Engaging in experimental policy analysis is both valuable and critical.

Hewer & Collier 24, Rebecca Hewer, Senior lecturer at the University of Edinburgh, PhD in Social Policy from the University of Edinburgh; Ben Collier, Associate Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, "Hope in a paranoid place? Critique, utopianism and prefigurative policy reform", December 18th, 2024, Journal of Social Policy, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279424000321>, DOA: 9/12/25, Rslish

Simulating policymaking conditions

As intimated, CUPA prescribes two types of prefigurative play. The first is a make-believe, ‘as if’ type: we ask researchers to act ‘as if’ something desirable, if implausible, has happened. Specifically, we ask them to imagine that they exercise significant, if not unbounded, power to define policy and then do so; to act ‘as if’ they have just been appointed as a government minister or senior policymaker and then pursue a utopic political agenda. This will, among other things, facilitate and encourage the embrace of a diverse affective register. Play, as Cooper explains (2016), can be fun, pleasurable and stimulating, whilst the utopian impulse should be grounded in radical hopefulness and desire. And of course, rage and heartbreak do, and should, inform the way we engage with existing policy, and visions of the way forward. That these emotions are produced through, and are productive of, dreams and their reflexive deployment is a key dimension in CUPA.

The second form of play demands mimesis: a re-presentation of policy structure and process. As discussed, identifying and replicating the precise parameters, variations and ‘political pressure points’ (Cooper, 2013, p.14) of a policy system is likely to be a (sometimes prohibitively) difficult task. The complex and layered assemblage of the state is not only vast but also frequently indeterminate, sometimes hidden, and often shifting. To speak of ‘policy’ as a defined and easily identifiable ‘text’ is always already to turn something dynamic, fluid, contested and ongoing into a static ‘object’. The many dimensions of a policy system may be difficult to ‘capture’ and recreate, and will vary significantly given that different policy systems are constructed differently, formally or otherwise. This is, therefore, an aspect of CUPA requiring contextually specific development.

The simulated conditions identified and deployed by projects using CUPA will necessarily be heuristic, partial and interpretivist: tools with which to produce innovative and provocative forms of knowledge, which do not and cannot straightforwardly reproduce ‘outside reality’. Put differently, CUPA will produce policies that manifest via whichever simulated conditions have been selected, interpreted and ‘tested’. In light of this, the practical task of researchers will be to ascertain what policymaking conditions are identifiable, reproducible and of interest to specific research projects. We imagine that most efforts to articulate these conditions will require engagement with specific policy literatures, institutions and institutional literatures. For instance, one might wish to explore what resources are available to ‘real’ policy-actors working within contemporary policy systems. By way of example, the UK’s HM Treasury produces a routinely updated ‘Green Book’, a document which provides ‘approved . . . methods to support the provision of advice to clarify the social – or public – welfare costs, benefits and trade offs of alternative implementation options for the delivery of policy objectives’ (2022, p.1). Moreover, we would recommend that simulated conditions relate both to a polity broadly and to the subsystems responsible for the particular policy or series of policies under scrutiny. The challenge of CUPA is not merely to produce utopic policies, but to produce utopic policies in response to extant policies. Treating negative critique as prefatory to utopic policy formulation captures this commitment in important ways, but the brief could be extended. For instance, we might provisionally suppose that the way a policy topic area is constructed is a reflection of e.g. contingent configurations of policy-actors and institutional structures. To emulate and limit oneself by reference to this topic area would therefore be to simulate policy-making conditions.

The utopian components of this practice encourage radical experimentation within the constraints of the policymaking system. For example, a project focused on social security policy might attempt to unsettle how constellations of actors and ‘evidence’ are, or could be, classified and included in policy-making processes, within the established frameworks of institutional requirements. Kerr (2023) demonstrates that actors with radically different wealth privilege (welfare-reliant mothers and the super-rich) are awarded different levels of credibility and – subsequently – different roles in UK policymaking spaces. Whilst the poor are treated as sources of information, the wealthy become ‘epistemic agents’ whose knowledge is treated as equally credible to that of the state. CUPA invites theorists to not only explore how these dynamics might be shifted but to shift them by e.g. actively interviewing welfare recipients as ‘experts’ in committee hearings rather than ‘stakeholders’ to be surveyed, selecting and citing their accounts as ‘empirical evidence’ rather than service user opinions, and co-creating policy in collaboration, rather than consultation with them. In a policy area that often implicates the very poorest, and the very richest, as well as businesses, economists, behavioural scientists and so on, CUPA forces us to question who is a subject ‘expert’ or a stakeholder with niche interest; whose knowledge should be considered ‘objective’, and how this objectivity can be credentialised in a way that aligns with positivist demands for ‘evidence-based’ policymaking; and what policy outcomes might result. Put differently, how – and to what extent – can existing requirements and norms of policymaking be appropriated and repurposed, and what vestige of state conservatism remains? Through this enactment and play, conditions are simulated, and everyday utopic policies can – potentially – be produced.

Alternatively, a researcher interested in budgetary constraint might wish to ‘play’ with the pervasive neoliberal commitment to reducing fiscal deficits, without leveraging taxation. They might, for instance, confine their utopic policy re-writes to the budget allocated to an original policy. What socially progressive, radical policies – if any – might be realisable under this profound constraint? Is radicalism available on the cheap, and what are the existential consequences of proposing as much? This kind of project of prefigurative policy reform would have to tackle the not insignificant challenge of expressing social justice in regressively economic terms, and its reflexive conclusions might ruminate on whether redistributive policies are even possible in the context of austerity.

In imagining these projects, it is easy to foresee resistance to the playful co-option of statecraft. Critical theorists have long identified contemporary states as ‘bad objects’: patriarchal, colonialist, white-supremacist and neoliberal (Dhawan, 2019; Newman, 2019) and cautioned against entanglement which, intentionally or otherwise, reproduces its forms. How you approach these critiques depends on how you understand the ontology of the state and the normativity of entanglement. Much contemporary scholarship resists unitary ontologies of statehood (e.g. the state as monolith) in favour of an understanding of the state as a multifaceted assemblage of domestic and global interactions, institutions and practices that produce plural state ‘effects’ (Jessop, 2014; Newman, 2019). This subsequently undermines readings of the state as ontologically bad, rendering contradictory readings intelligible and opening up the conceptual space for radical engagements with different elements of state power – in which critique can operate alongside construction.

Illustratively, Stubbs and Lendvai (2016) suggest that we require a ‘double orientation’ to policy and power, so that we might ‘recognise hegemonic plans and projects, but . . . be attentive to their interruptions, disjunctures and challenges’. From this perspective, engagement with state assemblages is not only normatively ambivalent but sometimes politically necessary. If state spaces hold the potential for transgression, then a politics of refusal might forgo too much. Building on this, and as parsed by Roy (2022, p.167) with respect to feminism, the notion that progressive politics is mired by entanglement with hegemonic conditions traps its proponents ‘into property logics’ and ‘defensive corrective labour’ that ultimately limit ‘world making capacities’. We are, Roy suggests, inexorably in and of the world, proximate to and inscribed in relations of power, inhabiting a ‘messy ground that cannot be cleaned up’ (Roy, 2022, p.176). In turn, she recommends critique as care – a way to enable accountability without the paralysis of total refusal. This, then, brings us back to the circularity of Levitas’ utopia as method, to the epistemological centrality of provisionality, and the necessary collective and reflexive work of deconstruction, reconstruction and so on.

Conclusion

CUPA realises the prefigurative, utopic promise latent in CPA. By elaborating on CPA’s commitment to positive critique, it augments its potential. When applied, we anticipate that CUPA will establish a library of hopeful, enchanting and provisional utopic policies that demonstrate the possible possibilities of historical state assemblages. Through enactment, and productive estrangement, we anticipate that researchers will use CUPA to establish a new critical distance from, and vantage point on, existing policy. In turn, we hope it will aid in the articulation and clarification of utopian desires and contemporary social movement demands. Moreover, we expect that, by identifying and testing certain kinds of political pressure points, CUPA will illuminate, in more detail, how these points frustrate progressive projects and how such frustrations might be addressed. CUPA encourages an avowedly emotional epistemology, treating radical hopefulness and deep desire as integral to the generation of intellectually and politically powerful knowledge. Not unrelatedly, it requires a commitment to the alleviation of human suffering and the realisation of human potential, as well as an imaginative response to related challenges.

Speculation represents a routine form of knowledge production in the field of policy studies, and critical policy studies is very often involved in normative projections. What added value, then, is provided by an explicit turn to utopianism, as described here? What does it offer beyond a renewed commitment to forwardlooking academic praxis and avowed, future-looking normativity? In brief, utopianism promotes particular epistemic habits, affective experiences and genres of expression with the potential to significantly extend and pluralise forms of policy knowledge. CUPA harnesses the power of our creative imagination and capacity to hope and play, and applies this power in unfamiliar and generative ways. It opens space to produce knowledge through enactment – enabling radical forms of expression and praxis.

#### 14---Using debate as a site of survival strategies fails:

#### A. Atomized survival strategies alibi structural foundations of oppression---focus on material transformation is the only way to eliminate violence

Papantonopoulou 14 – Saffo Papantonopoulou, PhD Student in Anthropology & Middle East Studies at the University of Arizona, MA in Anthropology from The New School for Social Research, BA in History with Honors from Brown University, “"Even a Freak Like You Would Be Safe in Tel Aviv": Transgender Subjects, Wounded Attachments, and the Zionist Economy of Gratitude”, Women's Studies Quarterly, Volume 42, Issues 1/2, Spring, ProQuest

Wendy Brown's words ring just as true today as they did twenty years ago when they were written. While Brown did not explore what, exactly, mobilizes wounded attachments, what we have seen since 1993 is an increase in the deployment of wounded attachments by neoliberalism and neocolonialism. The Zionist economy of gratitude, as part of a multibillion-dollar propaganda industry, is an economy in a very literal sense. Pinkwashing deploys preexisting tropes of Jewish victimization inherent to Zionism, in an attempt to hail the transgender subject into a debt of gratitude toward neoliberalism. This narrative deploys vulnerability as economic capital, and its historical rise coincides with a tactical and discursive shift by radical and progressive politics within the West. This shift has been a move toward hyperindividualized projects of semiotic and representational interventions into existing systems. This is encapsulated in the assump- tion that through better (media) representation, and precisely defined terminologies, transgender people and other oppressed people may find liberation.

The renaturalization of capitalism within late twentieth-century identity politics is both a product of and produced by the reframing of both temporality and the individual's relation to the collective within purportedly liberatory political projects. No longer part of a mass movement that aims toward liberation of the collective in historical time, we are instead relegated to a totality of atomized individuals, each struggling to survive. The struggles for survival are very much real, but the ways in which they have been politicized-even more, the ways in which survival within the existing system has become the political project-reflect an internalization of Margaret Thatcher's infamous quip "There is no alternative." We are often grappling with subjectivities that have been produced by disciplinary regimes in order not to survive. Liberation will mean the ceasing-to-be of many of these disciplined subjectivities. And there are few things more terrifying than calling for the death of one's own subject position.

But this may be the point where it makes sense to part from Brown, as Brown parts from Nietzsche. After all, Brown does not account for movements-such as, say, the Black Panther Party, to name one example-that politicized identity as part of a liberatory project, avoiding both liberal co-optation and crude Marxist reductionism. Rather than focus further on Brown's notion of wounds and traumas, it may be useful to reevaluate Fanons notion of catharsis in the twenty-first century. What might we imagine a transgender catharsis could look like? To Fanon, catharsis happens as part of decolonial struggle, which is, in his words, "an agenda for total disorder. But it cannot be accomplished by the wave of a magic wand ... or a gentleman's agreement." Fanon specifies that decolonial struggle "is an historical process" (1963,2). Liberation, catharsis, and healing from trauma will not happen on the level of a matrix of individuals, or a more precise regime of signification, and no theoretical intervention (even on the part of this text) will bring it into being. Again, we cannot signify our way toward liberation as something that happens in historical time; we cannot make a priori promises of safety or security. There is unfortunately no predicting what, exactly, a historical unraveling of a violent system may bring about. But we can, at the very least, prepare ourselves, by critically examining what sort of political tropes we reproduce in attempting to name our pain. Demanding liberation in historical time, through a collective struggle that places more weight on the material than on the semiotic or symbolic, while simultaneously allowing geocultural cross-pollination of ideas and signifiers without a historically deterministic search for "origins" (Foucault 1977), may allow us to break out of cycles of debt and gratitude. But this change will not happen through theoretical intervention alone; it must happen through a structural and material transformation of the world we live in.

#### B. Subjectivity DA---Privileging in-round “coping” bolsters a qualitative approach that dominant groups use to oppress

Tonn 5 – Mari Boor Tonn, Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall

This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan “The Personal Is Political” to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model’s emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan’s landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues— models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as “elitist” or “monologic”—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate “in what we call the reality-based community.” Such people “believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality.” Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: “That’s not the way the world really works anymore . . . We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality— judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities.”103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, “A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its ‘surgical’ proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function.” The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, “is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts.”104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the “heart” of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

#### C. Reification DA---the starting-point assumption of “survival” cements psychological violence and hampers anti-racist strategies

Pinn 4 – Anthony B. Pinn, Professor of Religious Studies at Macalester College, currently researching religion in the African Diaspora and social protest thought, He has authored The Varieties of African American Religious Experience , The Black Church in the Post-Civil Rights Era Why Lord?: Suffering and Evil in Black Theology, and has edited By These Hands: A Documentary History of African American Humanism He is currently researching religion in the African Diaspora and social protest thought in the AME church “‘‘Black Is ,Black Ain’t ’’: Victor Anderson, African American Theological Thought, and Identity”, He identifies as an African-American. Dialog – Volume 43, Issue 1, pages 54–62, March 2004 – via Wiley Database

Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling....So fun- damental is the difference between these two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color. 7 This formulation was actualized outside of Europe because it served as the bases for relations in what becomes the United States. Through the rhetoric of figures such as Thomas Jefferson, for example, aes- thetic and intellectual distinctions between Africans and Europeans are accepted and used to rationalize slavery as the basis for economic growth and social codes of conduct (1787, Notes on the State of Virginia ). African American philosophy has spent much energy engaged in racial apologetics because of the successful transposition of the ‘‘European genius’’ to the ‘‘New World.’’ In response to this European ‘‘spirit of the age,’’ Black criticism devel- oped a counter-discourse that Anderson labels onto- logical blackness . Generally, Black apologists refute(d) claims of white supremacy by presenting Black cultural genius—the uniqueness of African American contributions to culture—as grounds for Black participation in social progress and democratic humanism, and the race’s eventual uplift. Although one might initially recognize the appealing quality of this argument with respect to Black survival, it is fundamentally flawed because it is predicated upon acceptance of the whiteness—white superiority— Black apologists reject. It is in this segment of Anderson’s text that one first encounters his critique of ontological blackness. Albeit passionate and reasoned, Anderson argues that versions of this argument from the likes of David Walker, Maria Stewart, and Reverdy Ransom inadvertently re-enforced racial ideologies, thereby damaging life options available to African Ameri- cans. That is to say, only activities mirroring and advancing this particular sense of Black genius are acceptable; other activities exist outside of ‘‘Black life.’’ In a very real way African American collective identity so defined creates internal conflict because individual desires and styles are always subject to the Black ‘‘party-line.’’ The ‘‘conscious lives of blacks are experienced as bound by unresolved binary dialectics of slavery and freedom, negro and citizen, insider and outsider, black and white, struggle and survival.’ Viewing these issues from the context of overtly religious thought, it is reasonable to say that Black religious studies participates in this ideological game by demonstrating the uniqueness of Black religion in opposition to White religious expression. Ontologi- cal blackness denotes a provincial or ‘clan-ness’ understanding of Black collective life, one that is synonymous with Black genius and its orthodox activities and attitudes. Race is reified, that is, treated as an ‘‘objectively existing category independent of historically contingent factors and subjective inten- tions in the writings of historical and contemporary African American cultural and religious thinkers....’’

#### 15--All discussions of black death aren’t pornotroping

Da Silva 13 (Denise Ferreira da Silva Professor at the University of British Columbia To Be Announced Radical Praxis or Knowing (at) the Limits of Justice Social Text (2013) 31 (1 (114)): 43–62 https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-1958890 https://read.dukeupress.edu/social-text/article-abstract/31/1%20(114)/43/33743/To-Be-AnnouncedRadical-Praxis-or-Knowing-at-the Spring 2013)

Nowhere is the violence in the equation the “other,” racial body = value + excess, more productively exposed in the disavowed sexual female body than in the indirect three- way conversation about slavery, blackness, and violence between Saidiya Hartman, Lindon Barrett, and Fred Moten.16 Whether it is a coincidence or not that such engagement involved three critical writers of blackness is beside the point because blackness lies, along with the other racial signifiers that write the “other of Europe” in affectability, at the center of the modern matrix. What I find in this conversation I have assembled is how all three interventions write blackness back into the political (very much in accordance with the US national text) with/out the sexual female body, when addressing racial violence. Doing so, however, they necessarily challenge us to return our attention to the colonial, against the grain of contemporary critical considerations of global market capitalism which, as I develop elsewhere, seem to be very comfortable enlaced by the disavowal of exteriority — the production in another place (the colonial land) — and, or, by the laboring bodies (the Slave’s and the Woman’s) that enabled its assemblage.17 The sexual body of the female native/slave, a usually disavowed referent of the texts that support many of the now- available racial and gender- sexual theoretical critiques, remains inaccessible precisely because she, as a subject of desire, cannot be recuperated in ethico-political accounts that presupposed Locke’s and Hobbes’s writings of the polity. Though she might be spotted in writings of the postcolony, she enters these texts always already a woman, always already resolved in the patriarchal economy where she can only be as the object of an unruly or ruling desire, that is, as subject of protection and reason for punishment. My thesis: the black body exhibits the equation racial other = value + excess, but only in the absence, in representation, of that other figuring of the sexual hosted by the female body. For her body only enters accounts of racial violence as always already in the juridical, economic, and ethical register of coloniality- patriarchy- slavery, that is, in accounts of domination, in bondage, marriage, and rape. My intuition here is that the sexuality of the female body refers to a power other than the sovereign’s — as it is 5 0 Silva · To Be Announced described in Fanon’s account of the colonial as the scene of violence and Bataille’s account of erotic expenditure — one that is beyond and before the re/productive capabilities of the fe/male native/slave body. It is always already defined in a given — economic and symbolic — productive regime: as object, other, or commodity. Let me restate the thesis with a description of racial violence: black body = value + excess. In Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman refuses to recount the violent scenes — in particular the beating of Frederick Douglass’s Aunt Hester — that mark the lives of slaves in the colonial and post colonial United States, and elsewhere in the Americas, for that matter. Refusal is Hartman’s response to the implications of the “=”: “I have chosen not to reproduce Douglass’s account of the beating of Aunt Hester,” Hartman states, “in order to call attention to the ease with which such scenes are usually reiterated, the casualness with which they are circulated and the consequences of this routine display of the slave’s ravaged body.”18 This refusal to rehearse what she calls the “spectacle of black suffering” is a political- intellectual gesture that, rather than disavowal, urges a consideration of how accounts of suffering do the work of racial subjugation. Here, however, I am interested in other aspects around and about this decision not to retell. I am interested in racial violence as a figuring of excess — which is what justifies otherwise unacceptable occurrences, such as police shooting unarmed persons In support of this intuition, I turn to two other black radical intellectuals, who have not shied away from considering blackness as a figuring of value and excess. What I find in Fred Moten’s and Lindon Barrett’s writings is precisely an in/articulation of the radical potential the juridicoeconomic figure of the (native/enslaved) female affords — namely, her sexual body, which insists on signifying Other- wise — The Thing, the mediator, that third element (virtual particle/free radical) that troubles representation. As already noted, this radical potential resides precisely in how this excess points to female desire, that which threatens the accomplishment of colonial and national juridicoeconomic goals and has no place in the ontoepistemological grammar that governs post- Enlightenment accounts of existence. Framing racial violence in the equation Laboring Black Body = value + excess, I want to acknowledge the relationship — as in the “I” and the “other(s)” — that is at the center of accounts of juridico-political power, both in regard to the colony and to the polity designed by European philosophers from the eighteenth century onward. Now, while in these earlier accounts, in Locke and Hobbes for instance, the writing of the human as the individual considers this political entity as a thing with reason, later, after Hegel’s rewriting of reason back in the scene of representation, in the symbolic register, the human as subject will be comprehended as also a Social Text 114 • Spring 2013 51 product of reason. To be sure, this is an effect of Kant’s version of reason as the transcendental mediator of experience, in knowledge and morality. However, the writing of racial difference to capture universal reason’s workings on the human (body and mind) is enabled by another move, in which that which distinguishes a particular mode of being human, the one found in post- Enlightenment Europe — that is, self- determination — becomes the realization of sovereign reason’s design. Precisely this move imposes Hartman’s, Barrett’s, Moten’s, and Fanon’s writings of racial violence in the equation black body = value + excess. Reading Billie Holiday’s Lady Sings the Blues, Lindon Barrett finds that relationship, between the racial “I” and the racial “other,” signified in the white steps of one of the houses Holiday cleaned. With Marx and Baudrillard, guided by Holiday’s excessive pricing of her nonvalued labor (here The Thing works by checking exchange value), Barrett decomposes the differential dimension that the notion of value both presupposes and communicates. Much like Fanon, he disregards the dialectic, perhaps searching for the cracks that undermine an otherwise seemingly stable power configuration, and he splits value, into “form” and “force” to sustain his notion of “seeing double.” In doing so, while acknowledging the hierarchy governing the relationship, he refuses to disappear blackness in reading no- value solely as negation. Negotiation — Holiday’s exacting of her excess — is possible, according to Barrett, because the boundary, signified in the white steps she alone can clean adequately, keeps the “inside” (the white housewife) and the “outside” (the black cleaning lady) in full view of each other, exposed.19 Nevertheless, this same move dissolves excess in the very system. For the violence suggested in his writing of value “as force” is suspended in the proximity it also refigures: “No matter how overwhelmingly value seems to impose itself as a normative design,” Barrett concludes, “a noncontingent form, a singular objective validity, it nonetheless reserves for itself an Other — a negative resource — and from the perspective of the reserved Other, the force and promiscuity of value are, with equal invariability, dis- covered. Invariably and paradoxically, value reserves for itself an Other perspective from which ‘value as form’ bursts forth as ‘value as violence.’ ”20 Turning it around, as the white steps, as a referent of labor, comprehend blackness/whiteness, then excess = value + violence. The workings of value, “as form” and “as force” in racial subjugation, both in the colonial and the national moments of US history, are re- presented in precisely the scenes of subjection Hartman refuses to retell. For Barrett, however, these figurations of violence do more than spectacularize black suffering because the boundaries they seek to protect, by ex- posing, also refer to the proximity value (im)poses. I will not follow further Barrett’s exposition of the duality of value here because I am more interested in how his 52 Silva · To Be Announced working through this distinction between “value as form” and “value as force” dissolves the excess in the form of value he names, namely, force or violence, which is both more or less than value, into a difference that is of value in itself. My interest is in how, when value becomes both “force” and “form,” the very force that destabilizes the form becomes Excess — much like sexual desire, which is not represented by the female slave body or the female maid body. This preposed excess — that is, the violence that is desire itself and the desire that is violence, not subjected to the rules of Colonial and Patriarchal (re)production — seems to have no place in Fanon’s and later writings on colonial and racial subjugation. For even in works that refuse the liberal version of racial domination (the logic of exclusion) and describe the scene of violence, the black body is given to representation, already the body of violence, the body of the slave, the body of the maid, the body of the lynched black child, female, and male. Always already the black and violated/violent person by the also already valued/protected white other — that is, a body that can only signify the juridico-economic architectures of Slavery, Patriarchy, and Capitalism. My point is this: The excess that is the never- exposed violence, the violence resolved in law, the state, contained in Hegel’s civil society, enters into the very constitution of the political categories themselves, in blackness and whiteness, the maid and the housewife, as in the native and the settler, the master and the slave. In regard to the laboring black body, for instance, racial violence permits the excess that is expropriation (beyond exploitation of surplus value), or excess = value (form and violence) + violence. What if, then, moving otherwise, dismissing value, entertaining excess — that which in a thing has no value — one stays with violence? If then excess = value (form and violence) + violence — value here in all its figuration, namely, judgment (ethical), measurement (scientific), calculation (economic), and appreciation (aesthetic) — what account of racial subjugation and of black response would emerge from it? Recall that my contemplations already presuppose Fanon’s description of the colonial space as a product of a particular kind of juridicoeconomic violence. There the distinction between the native’s and the settler’s position refers to a valuation, which is always already excess, which Fanon captures when he recalls that this distinction is named through the articulation of extreme moral signifiers, namely, good and evil, which allows for just one way to reconfigure the colonial space, that is, a kind of violence akin to Benjamin’s divine violence — which might be taken as the proper figuring of sovereignty? That being the case then, I submit that Hartman and Barrett have counterintuitively tapped into a potential venue for a post- Fanonian plan, a radical praxis, when each, respectively, refuses to write violence in the racial table where black means suffering and white means freedom or Social Text 114 • Spring 2013 5 3 (black) means nonvalue and white means value. Moving further up the road they open, one could take a short cut with Fanon and foreground the exposition of the violence that constitutes the colonial space to set up the explosion of the subject of colonial violence that would enable the obliteration of the Settler and his town and the Native (which then become a “new man”) and “his” quarters. That would not take us far because here still, as in Benjamin’s critique of violence and Bataille’s writing of the erotic, the subject of be- coming in revolutionary/emancipatory excess refigures what is represented by the male body and the account of desire it signifies: the nation to come, the Native as a Man, a self-determined collective, alone is liberated. Moving beyond this point, away from self- determination and its limits, in pursuit of a figuring of the sexual (as power) hidden in the writing of the female as Other — which for the time being I will apprehend in the phrase “the sexual in the female body” — another path would begin with an evocation of the body as excess. Here the body is a figuring of an un representable/unregulated desire which, unlike Benjamin’s moment of divine violence and Bataille’s erotic scene, does not refigure the sovereign (the prime figuring of self- determination) but remains without the legalmoral order and without economic and symbolic production, as a figuring of The Thing. I can anticipate the questioning of reading the body in the space of self- determination, the domain the mind has monopolized in modern representation. This is not my goal. I am interested in a frame of intervention that appreciates the body as a referent of The Thing, without (outside) modern signification, that is, one that exposes precisely that referent Hegel’s version of sovereign reason has protected in interiority, namely, desire. To be sure, by evoking the body in the register of excess (value [form and force] + violence), I do no more than to track its disavowal, to indicate how, when desire threatens to become a descriptor of the Other as Subject, the racial subaltern subject (the affectable I), it is immediately returned to the proper place, to the white side of value, from where authorized violence is done in the name of a regulated desire. Not surprisingly, the black subject of violence — as expressed in official accounts of the latest revolts in Britain — bothers radical black thinking because the tools of racial knowledge, the analytics of raciality, already resolve the unauthorized black male violence as pathology, an expression of Kant’s affect, the actualization of the non- self- regulated desire of the black Other. Black radical thinking, I gather, will only be able to dissolve this very consistent effect of raciality if, inhabiting the limits of justice, it begins and stays with excess — and embraces violence as a referent of other desires, other figurations of existence, or any other and all possible modes of being human in the world. In his book In the Break, Fred Moten does not evoke Fanon as the point of departure of his thinking, but he does stay with violence and contemplates the emancipatory gifts hidden in the inaccessible excess, in that which it forces into re- presentation without signifying, without value, a sound that is an uncomprehensible expression of affectability. Refusing to repeat Hartman’s gesture, Moten reproduces Frederick Doug lass’s account of the beating of Aunt Hester. He does not follow with a commentary on her violated black body — which would return violence to the white perpetrator and suffering to the black female slave, which sit all too comfortable in the post- Enlightenment political (juridic, economic, ethic) scene. Instead he takes up her utterance, her scream, an expression that is not a response. “Let,” Moten invites us, “the call of call and response, passionate utterance and response — articulated in the scene of Douglass identifies as ‘the blood stained gate’ through which he entered into subjection and subjectivity. . . . Let the articulation of appositional encounter be our encountering: a nondetermining invitation to the new and continually unprecedented performative, historical, philosophical, democratic, communist arrangements that are the only authentic ones.”21 This evocation of aurality, hovering before the letter and the phoneme, constitutes an acknowledgment of excess that avoids the two writings of racial violence, namely, the one that stays with the account that it is solely black, as in Hartman’s view of depictions of black suffering, and the one that writes it as always already involving black and white, the latter being the perpetrator, as in Barrett’s discussion of value. Alternatively, Moten reproduces neither because, instead of attending to the violated black body in the regimen of signification of white violence, the racial table, he listens for past and contemporary reverberations of Aunt Hester’s screams. In Douglass’s mother- like figure, he traces the moment of emergence of the subject of blackness in resistance, in a response to torture that does not reduce itself to word — perhaps because doing so would legitimize the power relationship, because doing so as a plea, a begging, would reinstitute the master’s place of power — which is that which Hartman suggests rehearsals of black suffering always do and Barrett indicates that in this doing so resides, if not black emancipation, at least the possibility of negotiation. Now, if the black subject emerges in a response which is a refusal of representation — without the letter and its signification, before writing but also not in speech — the possibility opens that violence can be contemplated without being immediately resolved in already given blackness and whiteness.

#### **16. We’ll impact turn the residual link---depictions are NOT essentially fungible, they’re key to foreclose dismissal and spur ethical response**

Michalinos Zembylas 13, assistant professor of education at the Open University of Cyprus, “The “Crisis of Pity” and the Radicalization of Solidarity: Toward Critical Pedagogies of Compassion,” Educational Studies: A Journal of the American Educational Studies Association Volume 49 Issue 6, p. 504-521

Furthermore, as noted in the previous section of the article, attentiveness to common human vulnerability is an important component of critical pedagogies of compassion. Students are enabled to establish and maintain this attentiveness, when they begin to question and challenge arguments based on binaries like us/them, citizen/foreigner, friends/enemies, and good/evil, a stereotyping of groups considered to be more or less grievable (see Butler 2004). For example, students will learn compassion when they start asking critical questions and gradually engage in actions that challenge the taken-for-granted policy in many countries of keeping asylum seekers in remote detention camps. These questions could include the following: Do asylum seekers have equal rights or not? Is each and every human being viewed as an individual with a history and identity that require respect? If yes, what can be done to show solidarity to the suffering of these fellow human beings? Once again, it is important to start with small actions of solidarity such as sending gifts, writing protest letters, and volunteering for nongovernmental organizations that offer practical or legal help to asylum seekers (Porter 2006). Clearly, writing letters does not truly alleviate suffering in any obvious manner, but it is a step toward helping; these are smaller gestures that may help lead students to becoming critical thinkers who continue to take action throughout their lives. Solidarity does not become radicalized from one day to the next; the intensification of solidarity comes gradually based on empathy, a community of engaged citizens and the constant interrogation of various modes of action and engagement for their effectiveness to fight injustice and subordination (see Barber 1984). Critical compassion is even further cultivated, if students begin to understand the conditions (structural inequalities, poverty, globalization etc.) that give rise to suffering and acknowledge some sort of human connection between themselves and others, specifically what it might mean for one to encounter vulnerabilities that students themselves might experience. But mere understanding is not enough; students will become more susceptible to affective transformation, when they enact compassionate action early on in their lives (e.g., from kindergarten) such as becoming more patient and tolerant with peers who do not grasp a difficult concept in language or mathematics. As they grow up, children are offered opportunities to enact more complex manifestations of compassion that include action to alleviate the suffering of people who experience difficult times, such as the asylum seekers enclosed in a detention camp. Thus, Nussbaum's suggestion that a student “must take the person's ill as affecting her own flourishing [and] must make herself vulnerable in the person of another” (2001, 317) is just the beginning. What needs to follow the acknowledgment of common humanity and vulnerability is taking action that dismisses essentialized categories of victims and benefactors and highlights, instead the impact of solidarity on reducing everyday inequalities. Recognizing the emotional complexities of structural inequalities is necessary but not sufficient; what distinguishes critical pedagogies of compassion is that they push students to go beyond that and engage in actions that show solidarity and altruism in practice. Taking a step back to reflect once again on what makes critical pedagogies of compassion distinct and valuable, one has to acknowledge the multiple ways in which compassion is assigned differently as it relates to issues of identity and structures of inequality. 10 Although there has not been any explicit research examining the ways in which identities of students and of sufferers come into play in the politics of compassion, it has been acknowledged in the literature that people of color and poor people are more often blamed for trauma and tragedy that occurs in their life (see Berlant 2004). Pity for these groups is often informed by this blaming and consequently structural inequalities are obscured. Blame develops as a result of performance, power, and othering; that is, blame is ideological and, therefore it is important to interrogate the emotional ideologies in which blaming is grounded. Critical pedagogues, then, need to address a number of provocative issues to reach their students and move them beyond deficit perspectives and cultural narcissism (e.g., see Nieto and Bode 2012). These issues concern the roots and consequences of blaming individuals, rather than structural inequalities and the ways in which vulnerability is assigned or read differently by/for people. Some individuals and groups are clearly more vulnerable than others due to societal structural inequalities and this is something that needs to be constantly kept in mind. For example, two people can experience chronic illness. The person without health care will be vulnerable in a way that is different from someone who has health insurance. By suggesting that it is important for students to engage in action, what is meant is that t hey need to work actively to address structural inequality—which is the foundation of much suffering. Recognizing, therefore, that compassion is assigned differently as it relates to issues of identity and structures of inequality and interrogating why this is so, is a valuable component of critical pedagogies of compassion. The recognition of the multiple ways in which compassion is assigned differently is clearly relevant to the issue of the simultaneous identification and disidentification with the suffering of the other that has been raised earlier. Although students (especially those who are privileged) become knowledgeable about other people's lives—including issues they have not had to endure, such as sexual slavery, seeking asylum, starvation, torture, or having a missile hit a marketplace (Porter 2006)—they also become mindful of how it is impossible to claim that they fully know and feel others’ pain. Attentiveness to the issue of simultaneous identification and disidentification with the suffering of the other involves cultivating in students the ability to acknowledge the symmetries and asymmetries of suffering. For example, this means that there are limitations to how far a privileged individual in a western society can actually participate in the suffering of a poor underprivileged individual living in the favellas of Brazil or the shanty towns of South Africa. However, the purpose of critical pedagogies of compassion—even if full identification with the other's suffering is impossible—is to create pedagogical spaces in which teachers and students in privileged societies can take some action and offer an alternative option over that of pity and sentimentality. 11 These spaces include analyzing, for example, how particular ideologies (e.g., nationalism, racism) are accompanied by certain emotional investments that might prevent identification with the other-sufferer or encourage identification only with certain other-sufferers who are perceived as similar. It is important, therefore, to reiterate that stories of suffering must, indeed, be heard in schools; however, the conditions of hearing them must also be interrogated so that the possibilities for compassion fatigue, desensitization and self-victimization are minimized as much as possible. This is undoubtedly a daunting task for teachers; it's not easy to create learning environments in which students learn to hear the other's suffering and respond to this suffering with compassion and care. Possible responses can easily lead to emotions of pity for those who suffer or feelings of apathy and indifference. These feelings disengage students from the mode of care and compassionate action. However, attentiveness to the different ideas suggested here provides responses to some of the emotional challenges that have been identified. Although this attention is critically important, it is also helpful to keep in mind that this approach is far from universal. Teaching for/with compassion in critical, action-oriented ways has the potential to enrich possibilities for solidarity with suffering others; yet such practice would necessitate that teachers establish trust in the classroom, develop strong relationships with and among students, and enact compassionate understanding in every possible manner.

### AT: Unions Bad

#### The labor power unleashed by the plan has embraced a new model of union struggle explicitly focused on racial justice. Critiques of conservative unions don’t apply, and struggle against them solves.

Suárez ’24 [Mario et al.; 2024; Associate Professor of Cultural Studies in the School of Teacher Education and Leadership at Utah State University; Equity & Excellence in Education; “Union Membership, Retention, and Perceived Safety for PK-12 Trans School Workers of Color,” vol. 57, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10665684.2024.2394904#abstract]

Although school employee unions have expanded the bargaining power of teachers in important ways (Dandala, Citation2019), many large unions have traditionally followed a business union model characterized by hierarchy, conservatism, and exclusion. More recently, however, and in response to years of internal struggle and teacher activism, a new model of social justice organizing has taken hold (see Dandala, Citation2019 for a review of these trends). The social movement union model places a strong emphasis on solidarity and introduces explicit efforts to democratize organizing and promote grassroots and bottom-up initiatives and coalition building with an explicit focus on promoting racial and social justice (Fantasia & Voss, Citation2004). Rather than focusing on immediate contractual disputes, social movement unions seek to build a broad consensus of stakeholders and community partnerships to achieve long-term and sustainable social change (Milkman, Citation2006; Soni-Sinha & Yates, Citation2013). As a result of this shift in organizing, unions represent one of the largest multiracial mass membership organizations in the country in which Black and Latinx members represent the largest and fastest growing portion of new union members (Bronfenbrenner & Warren, Citation2007; Frymer & Grumbach, Citation2021). To that end, there is potential to see how or if this shift is reflected in unions for school employees of Color.